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NOTE
Stelly v. Overhead Door Co. of Baton Rouge: A Severe
Hindrance to the Exclusive Remedy Rule of Worker's
Compensation
I. INTRODUCTION
In what may result in a severe blow to employers in Louisiana who lease
their business premises, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Stelly v. Overhead Door
Co. of Baton Rouge,' decided the issue of whether an employee injured at work
by a defective condition of the building is prohibited by Louisiana Revised
Statutes 23:1032, the worker's compensation exclusive remedy rule, from
maintaining an unintentional tort action against an employer, when the employer
contractually assumed the building owner's liability for vices and defects of the
premises through a Louisiana Revised Statues 9:3221 clause in the lease
agreement. This question was answered in the negative, thus the employee was
allowed to maintain an action in tort against his employer, contrary to the
overwhelming tradition of Louisiana courts in limiting employee's recovery to
worker's compensation. On its face, the decision may appear to have limited
effect, due to an amendment to Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1032 which the
court refused to apply retroactively. However, some of the court's language
suggests that a situation such as this, when an employer contractually assumes
a building owner's liability for premises defects, may very well continue to be
an exception to the exclusivity rule. If so, one of the most significant policies
underlying the Worker's Compensation Act will effectively be eliminated as to
employers who lease their business premises. Aside from being in derogation
of the Act, this result would be in contravention of previous decisions of
Louisiana and non-Louisiana courts that have interpreted and usually rejected the
so-called "dual capacity doctrine."2 For these reasons and those that follow, it
Copyright 1997, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. 646 So. 2d 905 (La. 1994).
2. This theory of recovery, sought by employees who attempt to sue their employers in tort
despite the exclusive remedy rule of worker's compensation, states that if an employer occupies a
status toward the employee in addition to merely the employment relationship and not directly related
to same, then the employer owes a separate and distinct tort duty to the employee based on the
.additional status. For example, employees have attempted to sue their employers on the basis of
products liability, the dual relationship being that of manufacturer/purchaser, and not simply the
employment relationship. Malone and Johnson have given the following explanation of the doctrine:
Some employers may employ workers in more than one capacity, and the question of
compensation versus tort as a remedy may depend upon an examination of those
capacities. The manufacturer of vacuum cleaners, for example, may employ tn individual
to clean the executive suite at night. Of course, the manufacturer's brand of vacuum
cleaner would be used. If the employee is injured by a defect in the vacuum cleaner or
negligence in its manufacture, may he sue the manufacturer (his employer) in tort?
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is suggested that courts should limit the Stelly decision's future effect, or that the
legislature should intevene to remedy the situation. If not, the main benefit of
worker's compensation to employers, limited liability, could be essentially
eliminated as to lessee-employers.
II. THE CASE
A. Facts and Procedural Background
The plaintiff, Joseph Stelly, worked for United Parcel Service (UPS) as a
mechanic at its Opelousas office. The building was owned by Elvin Ortego, who
had leased it to UPS. In the lease agreement there was a Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:3221 provision in which UPS expressly relieved Ortego of any liability
arising from premises defects.' Stelly was injured at work while attempting to
2 Wex S. Malone & H. Alston Johnson, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, Worker's Compensation Law
and Practice § 368, at 257 (1994). Louisiana courts have consistently denied the use of the dual
capacity doctrine. See id. § Ill(A). Courts in other states that have recognized the doctrine insist that
the dual capacity of the employer be completely unrelated to the employment relationship with the
employee/plaintiff. For example, see Kimzey v. Interpace Corp., Inc., 694 P.2d 907 (Kan. App.
1985); Home Ins. Co. v. Jones & Lamson, Div. of Waterbury Farrell, 373 N.W.2d 249 (Mich. App.
1985); Pavlek v. Forbes Steel & Wire Corp., 517 A.2d 564 (Pa. Super. 1986); Jones v. Kaiser
Industries Corp., 737 P.2d 771 (Cal. 1987); Windham v. Blount Int'l, Ltd., 423 So. 2d 194 (Ala.
1982); Salswedel v. Enerpharm, Ltd., 764 P.2d 499 (N.M. App. 1988); Hunsaker v. State, 870 P.2d
893 (Utah 1993); McGee v. Goodyear Atomic Corp., 659 N.E.2d 317 (Ohio App. 1995); and Dalton
v. Community General Hosp., 655 N.E.2d 462 (I1. App. 1995).
3. Stelly, 646 So. 2d at 908 n.3. The lease agreement's indemnity clause provided as follows:
(a) Landlord will not be responsible for any damage to any person whomsoever, even
those arising from defects which Landlord is required by his lease to repair, except in the
case of Landlord's positive neglect or failure to take action toward the remedying of any
such defects within a reasonable time after receipt of written notice of such defects and
of the damage caused. Should Tenant fail promptly to notify Landlord in writing of any
such defects, Tenant will become responsible for any damage resulting to Landlord or
others.
(b) .... Pursuant to the provisions of Louisiana R.S. 9:3221, Tenant agrees to hold
Landlord harmless from any responsibility whatsoever for damages to any person
whomsoever or to any property of the Tenant or other arising from the condition, upkeep
and maintenance of the leased premises, and Tenant expressly relieves Landlord of any
and all liability for injuries or damages caused by any vice or defect of the leased
premises to any occupant or to anyone in or on the premises or in or on any adjacent
streets, sidewalks, curbs, parking areas, or other walks or areas adjacent to the leased
premises. Tenant expressly assumes all such liability agreeing to indemnify Landlord and
hold Landlord harmless from any liability whatsoever for any damages or injuries to any
person or persons whomsoever or to the property of any person or persons whomsoever
arising out of the occupancy, use, condition or state of repair of the leased premises,
except as expressly set forth above.
(c) Tenant will indemnify Landlord and hold Landlord harmless from all loss and
expense of any kind which Landlord may sustain or which may be asserted against
Landlord as the result of injuries to persons or property resulting or alleged to result from
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raise an overhead door, one similar in appearance and operation to an ordinary
garage door.4 Stelly filed a worker's compensation claim against UPS and its
worker's compensation insurer, Liberty Mutual, and subsequently received
benefits. Stelly and his wife also filed tort suits against Ortego, Overhead Door
Company of Baton Rouge, and Overhead Door Corporation. Ortego was sued
as the owner of the allegedly defective premises; Overhead Door Company was
sued as the manufacturer of the door. However, in addition to his receipt of
worker's compensation benefits, Stelly amended his tort claim to add UPS as a
defendant.
The tort claim against UPS was based on its contractual assumption, through
the Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3221 clause, of Ortego's liability for premises
defects. The plaintiffs argued that because of this assumption of liability UPS
was liable beyond mere worker's compensation benefits.' UPS argued that
Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1032 gave it tort immunity from any lawsuit by
an employee other than those based on intentional acts.' The trial court granted
the motion of UPS for summary judgment based on the exclusive remedy given
by Louisiana's Worker's Compensation Act.'
B. Court of Appeal Decision
The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that when an "employer leases immovable
property and assumes the landowner-lessor's responsibility for premises defects
pursuant to La. R.S. 9:3221, the employer may be held liable both as employer
for worker's compensation and in tort when the employee is injured at the work
premises by reason of a defect in those premises."' The court of appeal first
stated that "[o]ver the years Louisiana courts have consistently refused to
recognize the tort liability of employers under any dual capacity theory or
doctrine."' The reason for this refusal, according to the court, is the legislative
compromise that was envisioned with the passage of the Worker's Compensation
Act. That is, employers would be made liable for worker's compensation
benefits to an employee injured on the job regardless of the level of the
employer's fault, if any. In return, employers, in all circumstances, even their
clear and unmistakable negligence, would not be answerable in damages other
than such benefits in worker's compensation.' 0 An exception to this exclusivity
any fault or negligence of Tenant or of Tenant's agents or employees, or from the
ownership, use, occupancy or maintenance of the leaised premises.
Id.
4. Id. at n.4.
5. Id. at 908-09.
6. Id. at 909.
7. Id.
8. Stelly v. Overhead Door Co., 631 So. 2d 698, 700 (La. App. 3d Cir.), rev d, 646 So. 2d
905 (994).
9. Id. (emphasis in original).
10. Id.
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rule arises when the basis of the tort suit is an alleged intentional act," and is
not applicable to the Stelly situation.
Pursuant to this well-established legislative compromise, the court found no
reported case in Louisiana which allowed recovery against the employer under
a dual capacity doctrine, other than Ducote v. Albert.2 Even this decision was
easily distinguishable, according to the court. Ducote involved an employee's
malpractice action against a company physician. The Louisiana Supreme Court
rejected the physician's claim of immunity in Ducote, based on the assertion that
the compromise considerations between employers and employees, on which the
Worker's Compensation Act rests, were not applicable to the malpractice of a
company physician.' 3 Such a risk of malpractice was not an inherent risk in the
production process of the employer, as was envisioned by the legislature. To
allow immunity would be to protect some physicians who were fortunate enough
to join the ranks of an established employer at the expense and detriment of
private practitioners who did not enjoy this luxury."' The court held the
company doctor to be comparable to an independent contractor, and therefore
expressly excluded from protection under the Louisiana Worker's Compensation
Act.s Since the situation in Stelly involved merely an injury at work without
the negligence of an actor such as the physician in Ducote, neither the
independent contractor rule nor the dual capacity doctrine of Ducote was
applicable, according to the court.
The court of appeal, having distinguished Ducote, then proceeded to discuss
other Louisiana decisions which refused to allow recovery against an employer
under a dual capacity theory. The court relied on White v. Naquin,16 Deagrac-
las v. Chandler," and Roberts v. Orpheum Corp.,'8 all of which are discussed
below, in agreeing with the trial court. Finally, the court noted that the dual
capacity doctrine sought by the plaintiffs had been specifically rejected by the
Louisiana Legislature in 1989." Act Number 454 of 1989 amended Louisiana
Revised Statutes 23:1032 to expressly exclude claims against employers "under
any dual capacity theory or doctrine."'" Although Stelly was injured prior to
the 1990 effective date of the amendment, the court of appeal concluded that the
consistent case law on the issue of dual capacity mandated retroactive application
of what it believed was interpretive legislation."'
11. La. R.S. 23:1032(B) (1985).
12. 521 So. 2d 399 (La. 1988).
13. Stelly, 631 So. 2d at 700 (citing Ducote, 521 So. 2d at 399).
14. Id.
15. Independent contractors are excluded from worker's compensation coverage in La. R.S.
23:1021(6) (1985).
16. 500 So. 2d 436 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986).
17. 551 So. 2d 25 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989).
18. 610 So. 2d 1097 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992), writ denied, 616 So. 2d 682 (1993).
19. Stelly v. Overhead Door Co., 631 So. 2d 698, 702 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994).
20. Id.
21. Id.
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C. Supreme Court Decision
-On the Stellys' application, the Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari
to decide the following issues:
[Whether Act 454 of 1989 is interpretative legislation which applies
retroactively to the facts of this case and, if not, whether the limitative
effects of the pre-amendment version of LSA-R.S. 23:1032 can be
interpreted to shield an employer that contractually assumes the-liability
of an otherwise liable third party, from an unintentional tort action by
its injured employee.'
The supreme court, in an opinion written by Pro Tern Judge Felicia Toney Williams
of the second circuit court of appeal, first recognized the compromise made
between labor forces and employers under the Worker's Compensation Act. "The
compromise obligates the employer to surrender its immunity against liability when
it was without fault and, in return, the employee loses his right to recover full
damages from. the employer for his injury and accepts instead a limited sum for
compensation." The court then cited its own recent decision of Roberts v.
Sewerage and Water Board of New Orlean? for an underlying premise which
would eventually govern its decision in the case at issue: that a court should
liberally construe the coverage provisions ofthe Worker's Compensation Act while
narrowly construing the immunity provisions, and that "every presumption should
be on the side of preserving the general tort or delictual rights of an injured worker
against the actual wrongdoer."'  Thus, already leaning in favor of the plaintiff,
the court proceeded to reject the analysis of the court of appeal.
The court stated the nature of the dual capacity doctrine as follows:
Louisiana's dual capacity theory or doctrine pertains to employers
with multiple relationships, connections or involvement to the employ-
ee's injury and/or the cause of the injury, which ordinarily would result
in liability being imposed upon the employer by operation of law in
addition to the provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act. The dual
capacity doctrine limits the injured employee's recovery to worker's
compensation benefits, precluding the pursuit of their tort claims against
their employer.2
22. Stelly v. Overhead Door Co., 646 So. 2d 905, 909 (La. 1994).
23. Id. at 909-10 (citing 2 Malone & Johnson, supra note 2. § 361).
24. 634 So. 2d 341 (La. 1994).
25. Stelly. 646 So. 2d at 910 (citing Roberts, 634 So. 2d at 341). It should be noted that the
Roberts decision involved the question of whether the New Orleans Sewerage and Water Board was
liable as a "third person" in a tort action by an employee of another political subdivision, the city of
New Orleans. This is quite different from a case like Stelly in which the plaintiff is attempting to
sue the employer itself under a dual capacity theory.
26. Sicily, 646 So. 2d at 910. It seems as if Judge Williams made an oversight which should
be pointed out. It is not the dual capacity doctrine itself which limits the employee's recovery to
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The supreme court, however, unlike the third circuit, stated that the doctrine was
not all-encompassing. According to the court, the doctrine has been used
exclusively in situations where liability is imposed on an employer by operation
of law due to some status that the employer incurs aside from being an
employer, i.e., as an owner of a defective building, or a manufacturer of a
defective product. In language that could potentially have serious and devastat-
ing future ramifications, the court stated that "[tihe dual capacity doctrine,
however, has never encompassed contractually assumed liability. It has
consistently been limited to situations involving liability imposed by law due to
a legal capacity or status in addition to that of employer." 7 Thus, the court
chose not to reject application of the dual capacity theory to the facts of the
case, because the employer assumed the liability of a third party through a
contract. 8  This decision was made despite the lack of any support from
existing case law.
UPS argued that Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1032 precluded a tort action
regardless of the nature of the liability, statutory or contractual. In support of
this claim, UPS asserted that the 1989 amendment showed the intent of the
Louisiana Legislature to preclude any suit.by an employee against an employer
based on the dual capacity doctrine. 9
Because of this assertion, the supreme court then discussed the issue of
whether this legislation was procedural or interpretive, and thus applicable
prospectively and retroactively, or whether it was substantive, and applicable
prospectively only, pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code article 6. Judge Williams
concluded that the amendment to Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1032 was
substantive and thus to be applied prospectively only:
[T]he legislation is not interpretative or procedural as it does not
establish the meaning of LSA-R.S. 23:1032, nor does it prescribe
methods for enforcing the substantive rights and obligations already set
forth in the statute. Rather, the enactment is a substantive law. It
destroys rights or causes of actions [sic] by specifically barring any tort
action brought under a dual capacity theory."
worker's compensation benefits, but rather the rejection of the dual capacity doctrine. The
application of the doctrine would instead give the employee a separate right of action against the
employer. As will be shown below, the overwhelming majority of Louisiana courts have refused to
apply the doctrine. The supreme court in Stelly recognizes this line of decisions, citing Deagracias
v. Chandler, 551 So. 2d 25 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989); White v. Naquin, 500 So. 2d 436 (La. App. Ist
Cir. 1986); and Wright v. Moore, 380 So. 2d 172 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979), writ denied, 382 So. 2d
164 (1980). However, instead of following this consistent line of Louisiana case law, the Stelly court
chose to allow an employee to assert a cause of action against his employer.
27. Stelly, 646 So. 2d at 911 (citing Knoll, J., dissenting in the court of appeal decision, 631
So. 2d at 702 (emphasis in original)). Ramifications discussed infra.
25. Stelly, 646 So. 2d at 911.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 912.
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Somewhat contradictorily, the court stated in footnote 8 that "Louisiana courts
have consistently rejected the dual capacity doctrine.... Thus, there was no
confusion which necessitated a clarification of the law."'" If the law was
already clear in its rejection of actions based on a dual capacity of an employer,
then there obviously could be no causes of action left to destroy by the 1989
amendment. Thus, rather than being a substantive change, it seems the
amendment was more of an interpretive one, since it merely described the law
("interpreted" it) as the court concedes it existed at the time. Nonetheless, the
court concluded the amending legislation was substantive and thus inapplicable
to the facts at hand, even while recognizing the decision of Putzeys v.
Schreiber,32 which specifically held the 1989 amendment to be interpretive and
thus applicable retroactively.
Proceeding on the premise that the pre-amendment version of Louisiana
Revised Statutes 23:1032 would govern the facts of this case, the court then
recognized an employee's statutory right, under Louisiana Revised Statutes
23:1101, to pursue an action in tort against third parties who may have been
negligent or strictly liable." The court stated that Louisiana Revised Statutes
23:1101 "reaffirms the concept that our Worker's Compensation Act seeks to
insure the tortfeasor is held responsible for the damages he or she causes, and
is not permitted to escape liability merely because the victim may be entitled to
assert a claim for compensation from the employer."3'
One such party who may be responsible to an injured employee is the owner
of a building alleged to be defective. This liability was recognized by the court,
arising from Louisiana Civil Code articles 660, 2317, 2322, and 2695." The
court also stated an exception to this premises liability: "A lessee may
contractually assume the owner's responsibilities for the condition of the leased
premises, including liability for any injuries resulting from defects in the
premises pursuant to LSA-R.S. 9:3231 ." ' Because of the Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:3221 provision in UPS' lease with Ortego, the court held that "UPS
did not intend to restrict or exempt itself from liability for injuries caused to its
own employees."" The court stated that the lease agreement had the effect of
law between its parties, and made no limitations as to potential claimants. That
is, the agreement did not exclude situations in which the injured party was an
31. Id. at n.8.
32. 576 So. 2d 563 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 578 So. 2d 932 (1991).
33. Stelly, 646 So. 2d at 912-13.
34. Id. at 913 (citing 2 Malone & Johnson, supra note 2, § 367, at 169).
35. Steily, 646 So. 2d at 913. •
36. Id. (Error in original opinion. The correct statute is La. ILS. 9:3221 (1985), which states
as follows: "The owner of premises leased under a contract whereby the lessee assumes
responsibility for their condition is not liable for injury caused by any defect therein to the lessee or
anyone on the premises who derives his right to be thereon from the lessee, unless the owner knew
or should have known of the defect or had received notice thereof and failed to remedy it within a
reasonable time.").
37. Stelly, 646 So. 2d at 913.
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employee of the lessee.38 Despite the tort immunity given employers under the
Worker's Compensation Act, the court stated that "there is no statutory
prohibition against a third person and an employer contractually agreeing that the
employer will hold the third person harmless."' The court found "no existing
policy considerations which prohibit UPS, the employer, from contractually
waiving its statutory immunity from tort suits such as this one filed by the
Stellys."
40
If it had given UPS the immunity it requested, the court stated that it would
have in effect allowed Ortego, the building owner, to benefit indirectly from the
statutory immunity of Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1032. That is, Ortego
"would enjoy the rights and benefits of ownership and, at the same time, have
the ability to contract away the [sic] all the legal obligations and duties owed as
a result of that ownership, without anyone acquiring the full range of legal
obligations and duties in return."'" Because the obligations to persons injured
as a result of a defective building must be given to someone, according to the
court, the obvious party was UPS, who contractually assumed Ortego's liability.
The court recognized but refused to distinguish the case of Roberts v. Orpheum
Corp.,2 which involved virtually identical facts yet a contrary result.
Chief Justice Calogero dissented, arguing that Louisiana Revised Statutes
23:1032 precludes any and all claims against an employer under Louisiana Civil
Code articles 660, 2317, and 2322, brought by an employee. According to the
chief justice, the fact that Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1032 "removes Ortego
from the list of third party defendants available to the plaintiff does not lead to
the conclusion that UPS, as indemnitor, is now deprived of the protections of
Louisiana's worker's compensation scheme." 3  Justice Hall also dissented
without assigning reasons.
I1. ANALYSIS
A. Pre-Stelly Case Law on the Relevant Issues
Although Louisiana is obviously not bound by the common law rule of stare
decists, our courts have traditionally used previous decisions as persuasive
authority, and have even employed the doctrine of jurisprudence constante,
which states that "when, by repeated decisions in a long line of cases, a rule of
law has been accepted and applied by the courts, these adjudications assume the
dignity of jurisprudence constante; and the rule of law upon which they are
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 913-14.
41. Id. at 914.
42. 610 So. 2d 1097 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992), writ denied, 616 So. 2d 682 (1993).
43. Stelly, 646 So. 2d at 915.
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based is entitled to great weight in subsequent decisions."" The pre-Stelly case
law may not have achieved such a lofty status, but should have at least risen to
the level of being persuasive to the Louisiana Supreme Court on the relevant
issues. However, it seems as if the court chose instead to disregard the constant
line of decisions by the Louisiana courts.
1. Interpretation of 1989 Amendment to Louisiana Revised Statutes
23:1032
As mentioned above, the reasoning of the majority on the issue of the
retroactivity of the 1989 amendment to Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1032
seemed somewhat self-contradictory and thus questionable. The fourth circuit
court of appeal had previously discussed the amendment in Putzeys v.
Schreiber,' a case which the supreme court chose not to address in Stelly. The
facts of this case are not of great importance, but the interpretation of Louisiana
Revised Statutes 23:1032 given by the court directly conflicts with the reasoning
in Stelly. The Putzeys court stated that the 1989 amendment to the statute was
intended to overrule Ducote, which "allow[ed] recovery against employers acting
in a dual capacity."' Now, said the court, "[t]he amendment makes it clear
that an employee's cause of action against his employer is under the Louisiana
Workers' [sic] Compensation Act except for an intentional tort.4 7  "An
employer may not be held liable for damages under any contractual or 'dual
capacity' theory." '" The supreme court in Stelly seems to ignore this holding
by the Putzeys court.
Also not addressed in Stelly was the Putzeys court's interpretation of the
retroactivity of the amendment:
As a general rule legislative acts apply prospectively. La. C.C. Art.
8. However, legislation which is interpretative of existing laws is
applied retroactively. The amended version of R.S. 23:1032 clarifies
the term "exclusive remedy" as used in that statute to include all claims
for damages including those arising under a "dual capacity" theory.
Since the amendment does not establish new rights or obligations but
merely clarifies existing law, it is retroactive.49
This reasoning is very persuasive. Since the pre-amendment jurisprudence
clearly rejected the dual capacity doctrine in all but limited factual scenarios like
Ducote, the amendment itself did no more than clarify that law."0 Only a party
44. Johnson v. St Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 236 So. 2d 216, 218 (La. 1970).
45. 576 So. 2d 563 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 378 So. 2d 932 (1991).
46. Puueys, 576 So. 2d at 566.
47. Id.
48. Id. (emphasis added).
49. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
50. See infra part III.A.2.
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who could show he had a vested right, under Ducote, to sue his employer in tort
should be exempt from the amendment. Such vested rights would be rare
indeed. Since the pre-amendment jurisprudence did not recognize the dual
capacity in a Stelly-type situation of contractual assumption of liability, such a
plaintiff would not have a vested cause of action taken away by the amendment.
Writs were denied by the Louisiana Supreme Court in the Putzeys case.
The Louisiana Legislature itself may have noticed this conflict of interpreta-
tions, for in 1995 Acts Number 432, it stated: "The provisions of this Act (La.
R.S. 23:1032) shall be applied prospectively only." If indeed this was directed
at the 1989 amendment, then anyone with a Ducote cause of action before the
1990 effective date would retain such action because the Ducote cause of action
was the only cause of action recognized under the dual capacity theory in
Louisiana. However, all other causes of action based on the dual capacity of the
employer-defendant should still be without merit. Because the pre-amendment
jurisprudence was very consistent in its rejection of the doctrine, as discussed
below, such an action would be dismissed regardless of the date of its inception.
As to these, non-Ducote actions, the amendment seems certainly to be merely
interpretive in nature.
Regardless of the interpretation given Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1032,
it is contended that certain language of the Stelly court may be read as never
precluding a tort suit against an employer when there has been a lease executed
with a Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3221 provision. This contention is discussed
below, and shows the seriousness of the potential ramifications of the Stelly
decision.
2. Dual Capacity Doctrine
The dual capacity doctrine has seen some acceptance in other states, usually
when the employer-defendant occupies a status in addition to and completely
unrelated to that of employer.5 Louisiana courts, however, have been very
persistent in refusing to apply the doctrine here, and the decision of the court to
apply the dual capacity theory in Stelly came as such a surprise to many.
In several instances, plaintiff-employees have attempted to circumvent the
exclusivity rule of worker's compensation by using a products liability theory
against their employers. These attempts have resulted in consistent failure. In
Braud v. Dixie Machine Welding & Metal Works, Inc.," the fifth circuit court
of appeal, in part, affirmed a summary judgment in favor of an employer, its sole
shareholder and its insurer in an action by an employee who fell forty feet when
a board broke. Part of the plaintiff's claim on appeal was that it was "unre-
solved as a matter of law whether an employer who is the manufacturer or
supplier of a defective product may be liable both in tort and for compensation
51. See supra note 2.
52. 423 So. 2d 1243 (La. App. Sth Cir. 1982), writ denied, 430 So. 2d 77 (1983).
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to its employee injured by the product."53 The court rejected the assertion,
stating that "[t]here is no cause of action in 'products liability' against one's
employer for injury for which the employer owes workmen's compensation."'"
In Tomasich v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,"s the plaintiff sued
his employer and its insurer on the basis that the defendant was the manufacturer
and designer of equipment that caused his injuries. The trial court sustained the
defendants' exception of no cause of action, and the plaintiff appealed, claiming
that "under the doctrine of 'dual capacity,' an employer, normally shielded from
tort liability by worker's compensation legislation, may become liable in tort to
his employee if the employer has a second capacity conferring additional,
independent obligations beyond those of an employer."5 The plaintiff cited as
authority a number of non-Louisiana decisions, but the court affirmed the trial
judge's ruling, relying on its decision in Atchison v. Archer-Daniels-Midland
Co.57 The Atchison decision rejected a products liability action against an
employer where the employer owed worker's compensation. The Tomasich court
ultimately found "no Louisiana authority following the 'dual capacity' doctrine
cited by the plaintiff.""8
Deagracias v. Chandler59 involved a plaintiff-employee who was injured
while operating a backhoe on the job. He alleged that the bucket on the
backhoe, which was manufactured by the defendant, failed and caused his
injuries. The plaintiff sued under a products liability theory, alleging that
Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1032 excluded only ordinary tort liability, and not
products liability. The fourth circuit court of appeals refused to extend the dual
capacity grant from Ducote, and instead relied on "a long line of jurisprudence
which directly holds that products liability actions are not exempt from the
exclusivity of the worker's compensation statute." 60 The court held that the
defendant was entitled to summary judgment.
Similarly, in Smith v. AMF Tuboscope, Inc.," the first circuit refused to
fashion a products liability exception to the exclusivity rule. Worker's
compensation was the exclusive remedy of the plaintiff, notwithstanding his
allegation that his employer designed and manufactured the machine that caused
his injury.
Finally, in Dauphine v. F.W. Woolworth Co.,62 the plaintiff bought shoes
from her employer's store, and was injured at work when a heel broke. The
53. Braud, 423 So. 2d at 1246.
54. Id. (citing Atchison v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 360 So. 2d 599, 600 (La. App. 4th
Cir.), writ denied, 362 So. 2d 1389 (1978)).
55. 415 So. 2d 1002 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 420 So. 2d 446 (1982).
56. Tomasich, 415 So. 2d at 1002.
57. 360 So. 2d 599 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 362 So. 2d 1389 (1978).
58. Tomasich, 415 So. 2d at 1003.
59. 551 So. 2d 25 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989).
60. Id. at 26.
61. 442 So. 2d 679 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1983).
62. 451 So. 2d 1333 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984).
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court affirmed the dismissal of her products liability action, despite the plaintiff's
claim that the exclusivity rule of Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1032 was not
applicable because this involved a buyer/seller relationship. "This is a suit for
damages based upon fault, whether it be titled products liability or ordinary tort.
Accordingly, we see no justification for appellants' claim that La. R.S. 23:1032
should not be applied."63
Aside from suits based on products liability, the dual capacity doctrine has
also been asserted and rejected in other theories of recovery. In White v.
Naquin," the plaintiff, a school bus driver for the Ascension Parish School
Board, received worker's compensation benefits from the school board when she
was injured by a student who tripped her at East Ascension High School. The
plaintiff subsequently sued the father of the student in tort, as well as his
homeowner's insurer, who filed a third party demand against the school board
for indemnification of any amounts for which they were held liable. The court
affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of the school board, in part by
rejecting the defendants' claim that the school board was liable not in its capacity
as the plaintiff's employer but as custodian of the student. The court refused to
apply the dual capacity doctrine, finding it to have "consistently been rejected by
the courts of this state.".
In Wright v. Moore,' the plaintiff was an employee of the state through the
Department of Health and Human Resources who was injured in a car accident
while in the course and scope of her employment. She received worker's
compensation benefits, and subsequently sued the state through the Department
of Transportation and Development, alleging that the two departments were "two
separate and distinct bodies corporate and that as an employee of one she [was]
free to sue the other in tort as a separate entity."67 The court disagreed; instead,
the plaintiff's employer was held to be the state of Louisiana. The court refused
to recognize the state as occupying the dual capacity of employer and tortfeasor.
Thus, the state was not a "third person" under the Worker's Compensation Act
amenable to a suit in negligence.
Hebert v. Gulf States Utilities Co.' involved a plaintiff who was injured
when an angle iron he was holding came in contact with a high voltage electrical
line, causing him to be burned. One of the defendants was both the landowner
and the general contractor who hired the plaintiff's immediate employer to erect
a building; thus, the landowner was the plaintiff's statutory employer for
purposes of worker's compensation." The plaintiff asserted that although this
defendant may have been immune from tort suit in his capacity as statutory
63. Id. at 1334.
64. 500 So. 2d 436 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1986).
65. Id. at 438.
66. 380 So. 2d 172 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1979), writ denied, 382 So. 2d 164 (1980).
67. Wright, 380 So. 2d at 173.
68. 369 So. 2d 1104 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 369 So. 2d 466 (1979).
69. Hebert, 369 So. 2d at 1106.
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employer, he was liable in tort in his capacity as landowner under the dual
capacity doctrine. In rejecting the plaintiff's claim, the first circuit stated as
follows:
It is apparent that if the landowner in the instant case were another
person, a third person who violated legal obligations to the employee,
that the employee could sue the third person in tort. Is the landowner
to be held liable in tort for breach of legal obligations when he is also
immune from tort actions because he is also the statutory employer of
the employee? We find he cannot. We have reviewed extensively the
dual capacity doctrine and find it is inapplicable. Even if the doctrine
were viable in Louisiana, the allegations of fault against the landowner
are really failure to furnish employee a safe place to work.
We believe the adoption of the dual capacity doctrine in Louisiana
should be made by the Legislature and not the Judiciary. We find the
Legislature has already expressed strong policy considerations in
formulating the workmen's compensation laws. We believe an
abrogation of these policy considerations is best left to the legislative
branch of government."
As is obvious from the above discussion of Louisiana law, the only decision
to explicitly accept the dual capacity theory was Ducote v. Albert,7 1 and the
Louisiana Supreme Court recently declared this case to have been legislatively
overruled by the 1989 amendment to Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1032.'
In Wright v. State," the Louisiana Supreme Court discussed the viability
of the dual capacity doctrine post-Ducote. The plaintiff was employed by the
state, doing business as Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans. He
developed a hernia while restraining a patient in the course of his duties as
security guard and received worker's compensation benefits. Subsequently one
of the physicians at his place of employment performed surgery to repair the
condition. The surgery resulted in complications, which required two additional
operations at a different facility. The plaintiff sued the Medical Center and the
surgeons in medical malpractice. The defendants moved for summary judgment
on the ground that the plaintiff's exclusive remedy, as an employee of the
Medical Center, was in worker's compensation.
The supreme court discussed the Ducote decision, and noted that it had been
legislatively overruled by the amendment to Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1032
in 1989. Thus, if this case did involve an allegation of dual capacity, the
plaintiff would have no cause of action. The court found, however, that this case
did not present an issue of dual capacity in its true sense. A dual capacity
70. Id. at 1107.
71. 521 So. 2d 399 (La. 1988). See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
72. See Wright v. State, 639 So. 2d 258 (La. 1994).
73. 639 So. 2d 258 (La. 1994).
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situation is presented where "an employer's second capacity is inextricably
intertwined with his capacity as employer."' The court cited several "dual
capacity cases where tort liability was correctly prohibited," involving "employ-
ers who occupied dual roles with dual responsibilities toward the employee at
the time of the work-related accident."" Among these "correctly decided"
cases was Roberts v. Orpheum Corp.,76 which involved facts virtually identical
to those in Stelly. a
The injury in the Wright case, however, was not work-related, but was "a
completely separate transaction."" The plaintiff was a patient at the time of the
alleged negligence, not an employee. He was not required to be treated at the
Medical Center, and the Medical Center owed "no employer-related obligations
toward the plaintiff/patient."' Accordingly, the plaintiff was given an action
in tort separate and apart from any benefits received under worker's compensa-
tion.
3. Recent Cases With Facts Similar to Stelly
Perhaps it is arguable that the facts in Stelly should not even trigger the dual
capacity doctrine. The court stated that the doctrine "has never encompassed
contractually assumed liability."" Because Stelly did involve contractually
assumed liability, perhaps what the court was trying to say was that liability was
based on a totally separate theory, such as indemnification, and that the dual
capacity doctrine was not even a determinative factor. To accept this would
mean that all the decisions discussed in Section III.A.2, above, that rejected the
doctrine, would be irrelevant. Even accepting this proposition, the Stelly decision
is still contrary to two recent cases involving similar facts and which did not turn
on dual capacity.
The third circuit in 1994 decided the case of Wallace v. Helmer Directional
Drilling, Inc.,' which involved the negligence and strict liability claims of an
employee of a lessee against the non-employer owner-lessor of the premises
where the injury occurred. The lease agreement included a Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:3221 clause. The court first held that the lower court's award of
summary judgment in favor of the owner-lessor was erroneous because there was
a material question of fact as to whether the owner-lessor "knew or should have
known" of the alleged defect which would nullify the transfer of liability to the
lessee under the Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3221 provision.
74. Id. at 260.
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. 610 So. 2d 1097 (La. App. 4th Cit. 1992), writ denied, 616 So. 2d 682 (1993). See infra
notes 85-89 and accompanying text for a complete discussion.
77. Wright, 639 So. 2d at 260.
78. Id.
79. Stelly v. Overhead Door Co., 646 So. 2d 905, 911 (La. 1994).
80. 641 So. 2d 624 (La. App. 3d Cit. 1994).
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More importantly, the court also considered the issue of whether application
of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3221 to this case would be contra bonos mores.
That is, the plaintiff alleged that the lessor was improperly benefiting from
Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1032 by delegating to an immune employer its
strict liability through Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3221. "[B]ecause the
worker's compensation laws provide the employer with immunity from tort suits
filed by its employees, the employee is left without a remedy against the
premises owner who may be truly at fault."'" The court chose not to allow
"such 'back door' tactics to defeat tort liability .... ."u Noting that this
situation was probably not envisioned by the legislature when Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:3221 was enacted in 1932, the court looked to the "balance between
the interests of labor and those of industry,"" and concluded that to deny the
plaintiff any recovery would tip the scales too far in favor of industry. The court
held that
when an employer deprives the employee of his or her strict liability
action against the non-employer owner by use of La. R.S. 9:3221, the
owner-lessor may not simultaneously shield itself with the immunity
enjoyed by the employer-lessee. It remains liable to the injured
employee for strict liability claims. The injured employee retains an
independent cause of action against an owner-lessor who has attempted
to transfer its delictual responsibility for premises defects to an
employer-lessee."
Thus, the Wallace court refused to allow a non-employer lessor to enjoy the
tort immunity of the Worker's Compensation Act. The Stelly court, on the other
hand, placed liability on the employer-lessee, sacrificing the purpose of the
Worker's Compensation Act to the detriment of all employers who make the
economic decision to rent rather than buy. Considering the underlying policy of
the Worker's Compensation Act, to effectuate the legislatively envisioned
compromise between industry and labor, the Wallace approach seems more
correct.
Roberts v. Orpheum Corp." conflicts with Stelly to an even greater degree.
This fourth circuit decision is in direct accord with that of the third circuit court
of appeal in Stelly," but was apparently not considered by the supreme court
in its ruling. In Roberts, the plaintiff was a member of the stage crew at the
Orpheum Theater who was severely injured when he accidentally stepped into
an empty elevator shaft. The building was owned by the Orpheum Corporation
81. Id. at 629.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 630.
84. Id.
85. 610 So. 2d 1097 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992), writ denied, 616 So. 2d 682 (1993).
86. 631 So. 2d 698 (La. App. 3d Cir.), r'evd, 646 So. 2d 905 (1994).
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(Orpheum) and leased to the New Orleans Philharmonic Symphony Society
(Symphony), the plaintiff's employer. Both parties were among the defendants
in the plaintiff's tort suit, even though the plaintiff received worker's compensa-
tion benefits from Symphony.
The lease agreement between the Orpheum and Symphony included a
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3221 provision in which Symphony "accepted the
Leased Premises in their present condition, and assumed full responsibility for
the Leased Premises, including, without limitation, all liability assumable by a
tenant" under said statute. 7 Regarding the liability of the Orpheum (the non-
employer lessor-owner), the court reversed a summary judgment in its favor.
Although Orpheum proved the existence of the Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:3221 agreement, and that the injury occurred to someone on the premises with
the permission of the lessee, it failed to establish that, as a matter of law, it did
not know and should not have known of the defect in the premises. The matter
was remanded to the trial court for this factual determination.
As for the summary judgment rendered in favor of Symphony (lessee-
employer), the court affirmed the trial court. The plaintiff insisted "that his claim
against the Symphony [was] not based upon the employer's direct commission
of a tort, but rather its contractual assumption, of the liability of the owner of the
building."" That is, the plaintiff sought an application by analogy of the dual
capacity doctrine as it was used in Ducote. The court distinguished Ducote,
however, with the following reasoning:
The risk of harm in the workplace was precisely the same whether
the employer was the owner or the lessee of the premises. Furthermore,
this employer specifically had control over the cause of injury. And,
had the Symphony not transferred ownership of the premises to the
Orpheum Corporation less than four (4) months earlier, a claim of strict
liability would not have been available to Roberts against the property
owner, his employer.8 9
Finally, the court stated that since the lease was executed prior to the injury, the
plaintiff had no property right of which he could be divested by the Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:3221 clause.
This decision provides strong reasoning in favor of releasing the employer-
lessee from liability beyond worker's compensation, and was not sufficiently
addressed by the majority in Stelly. Since the risk of injury was the same as to
Roberts and Stelly regardless of the status of their respective employers, the
"compromise" policy of the Worker's Compensation Act could easily have been
maintained, as in the other rejections of the dual capacity doctrine by Louisiana
courts. Unlike Wallace, however, the Roberts decision implies that the owner-
87. Roberts, 610 So. 2d at 1098-99.
88. Id. at 1101 (emphasis added).
89. Id.
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lessor may also be shielded from liability, if on remand it proved that it did not
know or should not have known of the alleged defect.
The Wallace court refused to eliminate the cause of action against the
premises owner altogether. By perserving the action against the lessor, the court
in Roberts and Chief Justice Calogero in Stelly had no problem with removing
the owner-lessor from the list of potential defendants available to an injured
employee.
The holdings and the rules of apparent general application from the decisions
discussed above stand out as being directly contrary to the result in Stelly. Were
these principles ignored? A few decisions in particular merit additional
comment.
B. Rules from Pre-Stelly Case Law-Not Addressed in Stelly
The injury in Hebert v. Gulf States Utilities Co." was alleged to have
arisen out of the defendant-employer's ownership of the premises. Asserting the
dual capacity of the defendant as landowner and employer, the plaintiff
essentially based his claim on a strict liability theory. In refusing to apply the
dual capacity doctrine, the court stated quite matter-of-factly that "the allegations
of fault against the landowner are really failure to furnish employee a safe place
to work."' Similarly, the Stellys essentially alleged the failure of UPS to
provide a safe workplace. UPS was sued as a landowner for having assumed
Ortego's liability, and the allegations of strict liability were really no different
than those in Hebert. It is almost as if UPS stepped into the shoes of the
landowner Ortego, and became the landowner for purposes of tort liability. Not
furnishing Stelly a safe place to work should have given rise to no more liability
than worker's compensation benefits, as in Hebert.2
With this idea in mind, focus should now be placed on the result in Wallace
v. Helmer Directional Drilling, Inc.93 Wallace upheld the exclusivity rule--the
rule that the employee has no recourse against the employer for negligence other
than worker's compensation-even despite the existence of a Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:3221 provision in the defendant-employer's lease. Recognizing the
importance of the legislative compromise underlying the Worker's Compensation
Act, this court, unlike Stelly, shifted liability to the owner-lessor despite the
indemnity agreement. By adopting this approach, the interests of the employers
in the exclusivity rule could be upheld, as in Hebert, yet any perceived
unfairness of depriving employees of tort defendants would be eliminated by
shifting the cause of action back to the owner-lessor.
90. 369 So. 2d 1104 (La. App. Ist Cir.), wit denied, 369 So. 2d 466 (1979).
91. Heben, 369 So. 2d at 1107 (emphasis added).
92. Writs were denied by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Hebert v. Gulf State Utilities Co.,
369 So. 2d 466 (La. 1979).
93. 641 So. 2d 624 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994).
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However, there is still the question of the unfairness to the owner-lessor,
who affirmatively contracted for this indemnity and had an expectation of
shifting his liability. This problem could be overcome by the owner-lessors
adding a supplemental premium on top of the amount of the base rent, which
could be used to directly purchase additional insurance on the property.
Admittedly, this would essentially accomplish the same thing as would an
acceptance of Stelly and requiring the employers to purchase the additional
insurance. But, this way the stability of the exclusivity rule would be preserved,
and the fundamental principles of worker's compensation would remain intact.
Such an approach may even result eventually in courts holding Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:3221 clauses to be null ab initio when the lessee is an
employer, and thus read out of the contracts. Lessors would be very likely to
increase their rent and purchase insurance when faced with the possibility of
having liability that can no longer be shifted to the lessee.
Another principle overlooked by the Stelly court was recognized by the
supreme court in Wright v. State."4 The plaintiff there, a hospital security
guard, was given a cause of action against his employer, because the alleged
medial malpractice of its surgeons was completely unrelated to the plaintiff's
employment. Indeed, the negligence arose out of "a completely separate
transaction."95 However, in Stelly, the accident was directly related to the
plaintiff's employment. Instead of adhering to the principle that the employee
has given-up all claims for all accidents occurring in the course and scope of
employment, as did the Wallace and Roberts courts,96 the court in Stelly belied
years of worker's compensation interpretation.
Finally, the Stelly court completely disregarded Roberts v. Orpheum Corp.;97
it mentioned the case merely in a "but see" manner without discussing its merits
to any extent.9" This was a case decided just two years earlier in which writs were
also denied, based on very similar facts. The risk of injury due to premises defects
was the same in Roberts as well as in Stelly, regardless of whether the employer
was an owner or lessee of the building. This distinction, according to the Roberts
court, did not rise to the level of creating an exception to the exclusivity rule.9
Arguably, Stelly could essentially result in an unfair benefit given to employees
whose employers happen to lease their places of business. These plaintiffs would
not otherwise have had causes of action against their employers, and the others who
do not enjoy this luxury would be deprived of this right.
Unlike Wallace, the Roberts court suggested that owner-lessors may also be
relieved of liability if they did not know or should not have known of the alleged
94. 639 So. 2d 258 (La. 1994).
95. Id. at 260.
96. Wallace, 641 So. 2d at 629-30; Roberts v. Orpheun Corp., 610 So. 2d 1097, 1100-01 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1992), writ denied, 616 So. 2d 682 (1993).
97. Roberts, 610 So. 2d at 1097.
98. Stelly, 646 So. 2d at 914.
99. Roberts, 610 So. 2d at 1101.
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defect. The result would be an outright denial of two potential tort defendants.
Now although this may be a bit more extreme than the suggested approach under
the Wallace rationale,"o it is still an acceptable alternative. It should not even be
seen as unfair, because what must be remembered is that an employee gives up his
rights in tort in exchange for an absolute recovery for all workplace injuries. This
is a valuable consideration; employees receive some compensation for their
injuries, even if there is absolutely no fault on the part of the employer or a co-
employee. Losing another tort defendant, the lessor, is just another part of the price
that employees would have to pay for the luxury of worker's compensation.
It should also be noted that such an approach, under Louisiana law, would
unlikely violate the constitutional rights of employees. First, our courts have
consistently upheld the constitutionality of Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1032. 0
Also, our supreme court has stated the following:
Where an injury has occurred for which the injured party has a cause
of action, such cause of action is a vested property right which is protected
by the guarantee of due process. However, where the injury has not yet
occurred and the cause of action has not yet vested, the guarantee of due
process does not forbid the creation of new causes of action or the
abolition of old ones to attain permissible legislative objectives. Our
jurisprudence has recognized the validity of legislative regulation of
causes of action, including replacement and even abolition, that one
person may have against another for personal injuries.'02
This language supports the approaches suggested either under Wallace or Roberts.
Causes of action can be abolished in advance, and there is no reason why those
against employers and/or lessors should not be included.
C. Practical Problems Suggested by Stelly
The everyday concerns created by Stelly are obvious. Many employers, either
because of necessity or economic benefit, choose to lease their buildings. Faced
with yet another form of liability, many businesses could be forced to shut down
100. That is, to deny lessors the right to shield themselves from liability, by preserving an
employee's cause of action against them.
101. Redding v. Essex Crane Rental Corp. of Ala., 500 So. 2d 880, 885 (La. App. Ist Cit. 1986),
writ denied, 501 So. 2d 774 (1987) ("Plaintiff's argument that LSA-R.S. 23:1032 violates due process
is also without merit. Any right which they might otherwise have had was circumscribed by the
legislature by means of the above provision long before their cause of action would have arisen by
the death of their son. Thus, they have not been deprived of a vested property right." 500 So. 2d
at 885) (citing Burnmaster v. Gravity Drainage Dist. No. 2 of the Parish of St. Charles, 366 So. 2d
1381 (La. 1978)). See also Lewis v. Exxon Corp., 417 So. 2d 1292 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1982), rev'd
on other grounds, 441 So. 2d 192 (1983); Branch v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 370 So. 2d 1270
(La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 374 So. 2d 660 (1979); and Perez v. Continental Casualty Co., 367
So. 2d 1284 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 369 So. 2d 157 (1979).
102. Burnmaster, 366 So. 2d at 1387 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
1997] 1075
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
because they cannot afford to purchase or build their own premises. Others who
lease because of economic advantages will be forced either to purchase their own
buildings or build, and potentially operate at unprofitable or less profitable levels.
Businesses may even be forced to pass off the effects of this liability with higher
prices to the consumers of their goods or services.
Moreover, in our ever-increasingly litigious society, the judicial system could
very well experience an abundance of new lawsuits filed. This would further clog
already overburdened dockets with cases that would otherwise be completed in the
OWCA, without resort to the courts. This too is an undesirable consequence of the
result in Stelly.
If Stelly is upheld, and its feared effects start to materialize, yet another
problem that will surface will undoubtedly be insurance coverage. Businesses who,
despite Stelly, continue to lease their premises, most likely with a Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:3221 provision, will be exposed to a much greater degree of risk
than before. They will obviously want to minimize this risk through insurance.
However, most will find that their comprehensive general liability policies have
exclusions for bodily injuries sustained by employees in the course and scope of
employment. This will force employers to obtain additional insurance. Even those
policies that do not have these course and scope of employment exclusions may still
exclude injuries for which the insured has contractually assumed liability.
Businesses will be compelled to purchase such coverage, which essentially would
be insuring them against strict liability. Obviously this will not come cheaply.
Because of this increased risk ofa greater form of liability, insurers will undoubted-
ly increase the premiums on such coverage, if it can even be found.
Finally, another problem with Stelly that is easily foreseeable is that its
reasoning could also apply to any other type of indemnity agreement signed by the
employer, not just those in building leases. That is, if the key element of the court's
decision was the actual assumption of liability through contract, then what is to stop
a court from allowing a tort suit against an employer by an employee based on a
different kind of indemnity provision, even if this too would violate the exclusivity
rule? For example, many businesses, especially those in industrial fields, enter into
service contracts which include indemnity agreements protecting the vendor or
service provider. If an employee is injured by the negligence of this vendor or
service provider, even though he was clearly within the course and scope of his
employment, he may have a Stelly cause of action. It is unlikely that the court
envisioned such a widespread effect this decision could have. If the case is not
legislatively overruled, it should at least be limited to its facts-situations involving
the Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3221 provisions in building leases.
D. Suggestions to Correct the Situation
The Stelly court refused to apply the 1989 amendment to Louisiana Revised
Statutes 23:1032 retroactively. Perhaps the next time the court is presented with
a Stelly-type issue on a post-1990 occurrence, it will hold that the wording of the
amendment--'any dual capacity theoy"--takes care of the situation by denying
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a cause of action on contractually assumed liability. This holding would be ideal
and would prevent the problems discussed above. 3
However, due to the confusion created by reading the decision itself, such
a result may not occur. In a sense, the retroactive/prospective application of the
amendment seems irrelevant, because the court stated that "[t]he dual capacity
doctrine ... has never encompassed contractually assumed liability."" 4 This
language suggests that contractually assumed liability is a whole different
ballgame, completely distinct from dual capacity. If so, then Stelly causes of
action will subsist beyond 1990 factual scenarios. In this case, legislative
intervention would be necessary.
Such a situation occurred very recently when the Louisiana Legislature
overturned a socially undesirable outcome given by the Louisiana Supreme
Court. In Billiot v. B.P. Oil Co.,I"' the supreme court concluded that "the
remedy exclusion rule of the worker's compensation act does not bar an
employee from bringing suit against his or her employer for exemplary damages
under Article 2315.3."'" Almost immediately, the legislature responded with
Acts 1995, No. 432, § 1, which amended Louisiana Revised Statutes
23: 1032(A)(1)(a) to overrule Billiot. The provision now reads, in pertinent part,
that worker's compensation benefits "shall be exclusive of all other rights,
remedies, and claims for damages, including but not limited to punitive or
exemplary damages.. ., "
Since the result in Stelly is likewise contrary to the legislative compromise
of worker's compensation, the situation is appropriate for yet another amendment
to Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1032. After the Billiot decision, the legislature
was obviously concerned about the extent of liability that could be imposed on
employers. It is contended that the Stelly ramifications could be as severe or
even worse than those of Billiot. Stelly would certainly produce more litigation
103. Note that at least one decision post.Stelly has suggested that the cause of action allowed
in Stelly would not subsist in cases where the accident occurred after January I, 1990. In Harris v.
Housing Authority of Mansfield, 665 So. 2d 712, 714 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1995), the court stated:
Prior to its amendment in 1989, LSA-R.S. 23:1032 did not preclude an employee (or
third-party) from maintaining an unintentional tort action against the employer where the
employer had contractually assumed the liability of the third party. The incident in the
instant case took place prior to Jan. 1. 1990, the effective date of the non-retroactive
amendment; therefore, the pre-amendment version of LSA-R.S. 23:1032 governs this
action.
Id. Stelly was distinguished, however, because the contractual language did not contain an express
waiver of tort immunity or an assumption of liability. Also, the court in LeBlanc v. Continental
Grain Co., Inc., 672 So. 2d 951 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1996). distinguished Stelly because the facts took
place subsequent to the effective date of the amendment.
104. Stelly v. Overhead Door Co., 646 So. 2d 905, 911 (La. 1994) (emphasis added).
105. 645 So. 2d 604 (La. 1994).
106. Id. at 611. Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.3 allows the recovery of exemplary damages
for any person injured by a defendant's wanton or reckless disregard for public safety in the storage,
handling, or transportation of hazardous or toxic substances.
107. La. R.S. 23:1032 (Supp. 1995) (emphasis added).
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and liability in terms of quantity of lawsuits, even though the punitive damages
claims after BlWt may have resulted in higher amounts of awards. Employers
can only hope that a similar amendment is passed to overrule Stelly.
As mentioned above, the Stelly decision could be similarly corrected by
legislative intervention. Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1032 could be further
amended, preferably with expressly stated retroactivity, to exclude claims against
employers "under any dual capacity theory or doctrine, or under any theory of
contractually assumed liability." A reversal of Billiot was deemed warranted, so
perhaps a corresponding reversal of Stelly, involving the same exclusivity rule,
will also transpire.
IV. CONCLUSION
From the standpoint of employers and society in general, the Stelly opinion
may prove disastrous. Several otherwise unnecessary steps may be required in
order for employers to suppress this new source of liability, such as acquiring
additional insurance, purchasing their own premises, or increasing the prices of
their goods or services. Insurance rates in general may also 'be increased.
Considering that the legislature originally intended employees to give up their
tort rights against their employers, these results could have been avoided. One
hopes, however, the effects of Stelly will be limited to pre-1990 occurrences.
Otherwise, legislative intervention will be required to protect the interests of
employers.
Clifton M. Dugas, II
1078 (Vol. 57
